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The engine immobilizer: a non-starter for car thieves* 
 
 





We provide evidence for a beneficial welfare impact of a crime policy that 
is targeted at strenghtening victim precaution. Regulation made 
application of the electronic engine immobilizer, a simple and low-cost 
anti-theft device, mandatory for all new cars sold within the European 
Union as of 1998. We exploit the regulation as source of exogenous 
variation in use of the device by year of manufacture of cars. Based on 
detailed data at the level of car models, we find that uniform application 
of the security device reduced the probability of car theft by an estimated 
50 percent on average in the Netherlands during 1995-2008, accounting 
for both the protective effect on cars with the device and the displacement 
effect on cars without the device. The costs per prevented theft equal 
some 1,500 Euro; a fraction of the social benefits of a prevented car theft. 
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1  Introduction 
Crime is the outcome of an interaction between a potential offender and his or her environment. 
The environment offers opportunities for crime, such as property that can be stolen, but also 
constraints on criminal behavior, such as watchful neighbors. Some factors in the offender’s 
environment have received more attention in the literature than others. The interaction between 
the potential offender and the criminal justice system has been extensively studied; the 
interaction between potential offenders and potential victims has received much less attention 
(Felson and Clarke 2010; Cook and MacDonald 2011). In most of the study of crime, what 
potential victims do to prevent crime is either ignored or assumed to be exogenous.1 The most 
notable exception is the literature on the use of guns as private deterrent, which is strongly tied 
to the debate in the US on gun control and right-to-carry laws.2 
Similar to the limited attention to victim behavior, policies aimed at lowering crime by altering 
precautionary behavior are rarely discussed or evaluated – with the exception of gun control. 
The debate on crime prevention centers around public law enforcement on the one hand and 
rehabilitation of individuals with strong criminal inclinations on the other hand. The absence of 
debate about government interventions in victim behavior is surprising, given the strong 
interest in, for example, preventive health behavior in the public health literature and in 
preventive behavior within the context of natural hazard mitigation policy (Weinstein 1987). 
The empirical work that has been conducted in the area of victim-oriented crime prevention is 
mostly descriptive and lacks a research design that allows causal inference. In the absence of 
unbiased estimates of treatment effects, it is not clear how the benefits of policies in this area 
compare to the costs.3 Exceptions can mainly be found in the recent economics literature, 
including Cook and MacDonald (2011) and Vollaard and Van Ours (2011).  
The classic economic argument for government intervention in precautionary behavior are 
externalities (Clotfelter 1977). Victims and property insurers may not take into account the 
costs of public crime control. Under-investment in precaution may result. In addition, 
precautionary behavior may have consequences for the crime risk of other potential victims, 
both positive and negative (Clotfelter 1977; Shavell 1991). For instance, if precaution by one 
party reduces the crime risk for others, as in the case of some car security (Ayres and Levitt 
1998), then this is likely to result in underinvestment in precaution. Another possible rationale 
for government intervention are systematic mistakes in the way people deal with the crime risk. 
For many people, criminal victimization is a rare event. For instance, on average in the US an 
household experiences burglary once every 40 years, any type of violent crime once every 60 
years, and motor vehicle theft once every 170 years (Truman and Planty 2012). A growing 
                                               
1 An exception is the criminological literature under the umbrella of opportunity theory, in which the actions of 
potential victims are presented as one of the drivers of the supply of criminal opportunities (Cohen and Felson 
1979; Felson and Clarke 1998). How potential victims deal with the crime risk is not worked out, however, 
with Van Dijk (2008) as a rare exception, and hard empirical evidence of how victim behavior affects the 
overall crime rate is scant (for a discussion, see Vollaard and Van Ours, 2011). Economists took some interest 
in victim behavior in the 1970s and the early 1980s (Clotfelter 1977; Ehrlich 1981; Cook 1986), but later 
contributions are rare. Exceptions are Shavell (1991), Hui-Wen and Png (1994) and Helsley and Strange 
(1999, 2005) on externalities of private precaution and Lacroix and Marceau (1995) and Baumann and Friehe 
(2012) on how private protection may attract the attention of potential offenders. We discuss a few other 
exceptions later in this paper. 
2 For recent work in this area, see Cook and Ludwig (2006), Acquisti and Tucker (2011) and McClellan and 
Tekin (2012). Related studies on guns and other violent means as private deterrent outside the US context are 
Grechenig and Kolmar (2011), Lenis, Ronconi and Schargrodsky (2011) and Leigh and Neill (2010). 
3 Policies that have been studied within the context of car theft include publicity campaigns to raise awareness 
of the crime risk and what to do about it (Barthe 2006), the design of parking facilities (Clarke 2002), and 
mandatory application of security devices (Webb 1994). Later in this paper, we discuss work related to the 
electronic engine immobilizer. 
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body of evidence shows that many people fail to take appropriate precaution against losses 
from rare events. Precautionary measures tend to be only taken after experiencing the bad 
event. A rare event is not often experienced, and if it is, then the memory fades again. The 
result is that the average level of precaution is suboptimal given the losses experienced (Meyer 
2012). 
In this paper, we evaluate the crime-reducing effect and the welfare impact of mandatory 
application in new passenger cars of a simple, low-cost device to prevent car theft: the 
electronic engine immobilizer. The engine immobilizer has been the security device of choice 
for legislators. Member countries of the European Union made application of the device in all 
new cars mandatory in 1998, Australia followed in 2001 and Canada in 2007. In parts of 
Australia and Canada, the legislation also extended to the existing car fleet.4 The security 
device blocks a vehicle’s electrical circuits when the key is not in the ignition. It prevents hot-
wiring, a popular modus operandi of car thieves prior to the introduction of the immobilizer. 
The regulation forced application of the security measure on many car owners who would not 
have used it otherwise or would have installed it only later. In the absence of offsetting 
behavior (think of being more careless when owning a well-secured car), the regulation is 
expected to result in an upward shift in the average level of victim precaution.  
Whether the benefits of the regulation of built-in security exceed the costs – and whether this 
strategy compares favorably to alternative crime policies – is not a trivial question. Reducing a 
risk that is already low through a one-size-fits-all measure that does not discriminate between 
targets at high or low risk sets a high threshold for achieving positive net benefits. Car theft is 
rare: the annual victimization rate in the Netherlands was 0.5 per 100 vehicles in 1995. Most 
people face a risk that is lower than the average while a small group faces a highly elevated risk 
(Maxfield and Clarke 2004). As a consequence, a uniformly prescribed prevention measure 
may provide little protection to targets that are at high risk, and high protection to targets that 
are at low risk.  
Using detailed data on car theft, passenger cars on the road and application of the engine 
immobilizer for the Netherlands for 1995-2008, we estimate the effect of the regulation on the 
overall rate of car theft. Mandatory application provides a natural experiment in the use of the 
security device. The regulation makes application of the car security device conditional on the 
year of manufacture rather than the risk of theft of a vehicle. The resulting exogenous shock in 
built-in security allows us to estimate its causal effect by comparing theft rates of cars that were 
manufactured before and after the change in regulation. 
We find mandatory application of the electronic engine immobilizer to have been highly 
effective in reducing car theft. Uniform application of the device in cars reduced the overall 
rate of car theft by some 50 percent on average during 1995-2008, taking into account both the 
protective effect on cars with the device and the displacement effect on cars without the device. 
The costs per prevented theft equal some 1,500 Euro, which is a fraction of the social benefits 
of a prevented car theft. We do not find evidence for displacement towards other, related crimes 
such as motorcycle theft. 
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First of all, we provide empirical evidence on the 
welfare impact of a route less travelled in crime policy: strengthening victim precaution. As 
discussed, most of what we currently know relates to crime policies that aim to punish or 
rehabilitate offenders, and the little we know about alternative policies such as the one 
discussed in this paper is often qualitative in nature and based on small-scale interventions. The 
crime-reducing effect that we find is relatively large compared to what we know about other 
                                               
4 The legislative initiatives had an impact on other countries as well, particularly on small countries without a 
car manufacturing industry such as New Zealand. 
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crime policies, what indicates that victim-focused crime policies deserve further attention. As 
argued by Cook and Ludwig (2010), evidence on the cost and benefits of alternative crime 
policies is particularly welcome now that the net social benefits of commonly pursued crime 
policies such as increasing sentence length are becoming increasingly unfavorable. 
Second, we contribute to the evidence base on the causal effect of precautionary measures on 
crime. We exploit plausibly quasi-experimental variation in victim precaution to identify the 
causal effect. The otherwise highly endogenous nature of victim precaution may explain the 
scarcity of empirical evidence on how prevention measures affect the opportunities that 
offenders exploit. For instance, to the best of our knowledge, no study has shown burglar 
alarms – a particularly popular security device – to have an independent, negative effect on 
burglary (see also Cook and MacDonald 2011). Previous work into the effect of the electronic 
engine immobilizer has mainly been based on broad comparisons of overall theft rates by age 
or year of manufacture-cohorts, without a research design that makes it plausible that the 
change in car security amounted to an exogenous shock (Brown 2004; Kriven and Ziersch 
2007; Farrell et al. 2011b).5 Other factors such as changes to other types of car security and 
crime policies coinciding with the introduction of the immobilizer may well have biased 
estimates of the average effect on car theft, if such an estimate is at all presented.6 Moreover, 
cars with better security are on average younger – and we know the theft risk to be related to 
the age of a car (Maxfield and Clarke 2009). As a result, estimates based on simple 
comparisons of old cars without security and new cars with security are likely to be biased. 
Third, we add to the small literature on externalities of victim precaution, a matter of great 
importance when it comes to government intervention in this area. We find displacement to 
older, less-protected cars to be substantial during the first 10 years after the regulatory change. 
The overall effect on the theft rate remains clearly favorable, however, which is in line with 
previous findings (Guerette and Bowers 2009). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the regulation that 
made application of the engine immobilizer mandatory, arguing that its introduction can be 
considered as a natural experiment. Section 3 describes the alternative ways in which offenders 
may respond to a greater use of the security device. In Section 4, we describe our data. In 
Section 5, we present our parameter estimates, including a variety of sensitivity tests. Based on 
our parameter estimates, we conduct an analysis of costs and benefits of the regulation in 
Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2  Regulation of the electronic engine immobilizer: a natural experiment 
In November 1995, the European Union (EU) adopted Directive 74/61/EEC, which made 
installation of an electronic engine immobilizer mandatory in all new passenger cars sold 
within the EU as of October 1998. The Directive contains detailed specifications for 
immobilizers. The legislation allowed car manufacturers less than three years to adapt their 
production processes. In fact, by 1995, many manufacturers selling cars within the EU had 
                                               
5 Potter and Thomas (2001) provide a more detailed descriptive analysis at the level of car models for 
Australia, but do not attempt to estimate the average effect of the device on the rate of car theft. 
6 Conclusions about the size of the effect on car theft in the two studies on the UK were also precluded by a 
lack of reliable data on the application of the electronic engine immobilizer. Brown (2004) relies on anecdotal 
evidence about the period around which application of the device in new cars became widespread. Farrell et 
al. (2011b) use data from the British Crime Survey (BCS). Given the unfamiliarity of the general public with 
the device, which is related to it quickly becoming a standard option, it is highly unlikely that the survey 
provides a reliable picture of the prevalence of this device. For instance, based on the BCS 2006/07, 46 
percent of cars had an electronic engine immobilizer. The actual percentage should be at least 70 percent: that 
is roughly the percentage of cars on the road in 2006 with construction year 1998 or later. 
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already begun to change their manufacturing standards in anticipation of the new regulations 
(Brown 2004). 
The decision to mandate application of the engine immobilizer may have been spurred by the 
tremendous increase in car theft during the first half of the 1990s, which was at least in part 
brought about by the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 (Bradsher 1999; Van Leiden and Ferwerda 
2005). Because of the possible endogeneity of the policy change, a simple correlation between 
the overall trend in car theft and application of the electronic engine immobilizer is likely to be 
misleading. What makes identification of the effect of the device possible is that the overall 
trend in theft affected all cars, but the regulation only affected new cars. In addition, the 
regulation made the device a standard option in all new cars within a very short time span. It 
forced a difference between a sudden shock in application of the immobilizer and steady 
growth in other, unregulated security measures that may have affected car theft. Other security 
measures will not bias the estimated effect of the immobilizer under the assumption that the use 
of other security has not experienced a similar shock in its application in the years before 1998. 
The regulation can be seen as a natural experiment as it made application of the security 
measure conditional on the year of manufacture of the car rather than on the risk of being 
stolen. We exploit this exogenous variation in the application of the immobilizer by year of 
manufacture to estimate its effect on the rate of car theft. 
A comparison with the US shows how sudden a push the EU-regulation was for the application 
of the electronic engine immobilizer. Both in the US and Europe, the security device appeared 
on the market around 1990 (Brown 2004; Maxfield and Clarke 2009). In the first years, 
application of the device was mainly limited to premium makes and models. Soon, with the 
EU-regulation in the making, application rates of the device started to diverge sharply. Whereas 
the percentage of new passenger cars with an immobilizer only slowly expanded in the US, it 
experienced sharp growth from some 20 to a full 100 percent between 1994 and 1998 in the 
Netherlands. Figure 1 presents estimates of the percentage of all cars on the road with an 
electronic engine immobilizer installed for 1990-2010, for both countries. Overall penetration 
rates experienced much stronger growth in the Netherlands than in the US. Twenty years after 
the introduction of the engine immobilizer about a third of all cars on the road in the US have 
the device installed, compared to almost 90 percent in the Netherlands. There is no discrete 
jump in overall application rates in the Netherlands around 1995-1998 since the EU-regulation 
related to new cars only. 
[FIGURE 1] 
A comparison with the penetration of other security features in cars provides further indication 
of the shock in application of the electronic engine immobilizer. Farrell et al. (2011b) present 
data on the prevalence of central locking and car alarms in another EU-member state, the UK.7 
The prevalence of central locking in all passenger cars went from 35 percent in 1991 to 85 
percent in 2005. That amounts to less than half the growth rate of the electronic engine 
immobilizer for the Netherlands shown in figure 1. Since both the UK and the Netherlands 
were subject to the same EU regulation, and many car manufacturers sell similar models in 
both countries, the Dutch trend should give a good indication of what happened in the UK. 
Growth in the prevalence of car alarms in passenger cars was even lower than the growth in 
central locking. Even when compared to safety features that command strong interest from car 
buyers such as the driver airbag and the anti-lock braking system (ABS), the electronic engine 
immobilizer became a standard option more than twice as fast (Bovag/RAI 2006). 
  
                                               
7 Related to footnote 6: in contrast to the electronic engine immobilizer, security measures such as a car alarm 
and central locking are likely to be familiar to the survey respondents. 
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3. The offenders’ response to greater car security 
Potential offenders have a number of ways to respond to the greater prevalence of the electronic 
engine immobilizer in cars. First, they may simply give up car theft, and not look into 
alternative criminal opportunities. Alternatively, potential offenders may try to overcome the 
immobilizer, shift their attention to cars without an immobilizer or to other, related criminal 
opportunities such as motorcycle theft. These responses are commonly referred to as tactical 
displacement, target displacement and crime type displacement. None of these types of 
displacement are a given. Initially, the offender exploited the opportunity he had become 
familiar with, often hot-wiring to bypass the ignition interlock. Shifting towards the 
exploitation of another opportunity is costly and takes time. Consequently, if displacement 
occurs, then it is often limited (Cook 1986, see Guerette and Bowers 2009 for a recent review 
of the evidence). 
Reportedly, an immobilizer meeting the EU-regulations was close to impossible to overcome 
during the first years after its introduction (Der Spiegel 1997). To steal a car, thieves had to 
steal the key first (Levesley 2004; Kellner 2004). Apart from carjacking, which has remained 
very rare, to appropriate the car key, thieves commonly targeted car showrooms, jackets in 
restaurants, garment in changing rooms or the home of the owner (Kellner 2004). Alternatively, 
thieves could haul the car away on a flatbed truck. Clearly, these modi operandi involve more 
time, effort and risk than simply hot-wiring a car. Only some ten years after its introduction, car 
thieves found a way of disabling the immobilizer: taking over the engine management (De 
Miranda and Van der Mark 2012). Thieves were able to reprogram a car’s electronic system 
and could start the engine without the original key. This modus operandi requires considerable 
preparation and technical knowledge, which is a hurdle to occassional offenders in particular. 
To conclude, given the difficulty of finding other, easy ways to steal a car, the immobilizer is 
likely to have severely hampered theft of cars fitted with the device. 
Displacement of theft to older, less-protected cars may take place during the 25 odd years that it 
takes to replace (close to) all cars on the road. The scope for displacement depends on the 
motives of thieves. For instance, professional thieves looking for cars to sell are likely to be 
primarily interested in relatively new cars. Within a few years after the regulation started to 
have an effect on car security, easy-to-steal, young cars are no longer available for these 
offenders. In contrast, opportunities for non-professional theft such as joyriding are only slowly 
reduced through scrappage of old cars.  
The externality on older cars is ambiguous, however, since the electronic engine immobilizer is 
invisible to passers-by. As argued by Clotfelter (1977) and shown by Ayres and Levitt (1998), 
invisible security tends to create positive externalities because it lowers the average expected 
haul of a particular type of theft. Targets that do not feature the security measure may still 
benefit from the reduction in the average expected haul. The engine immobilizer is not 
completely unobservable, however. There are at least two ways of inferring the likelihood of 
installation of the device in a specific car. First, only cars that looked new around the time the 
regulation went into effect were likely to be equipped with the device. In the Netherlands, 
inferring the year and even the month of make is further facilitated by license plates. A license 
plate consists of a combination of letters and numbers, with more recent makes characterized 
by higher numbers and letters later in the alphabet. Second, model changes are an easy visible 
cue. Older versions of the same car model may be known not to have the immobilizer installed. 
For instance, the Peugeot 205 was phased out in 1998 and replaced by the 206. The 205 never 
had the immobilizer as standard option, and may be an easily recognizable target for car 
thieves. Depending on the familiarity of thieves with the introduction of the immobilizer, a 
protective effect is likely to be limited to cars that were manufactured late in the transition 
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period (1996-1998) that did not yet feature an immobilizer. We discuss the evidence for 
negative and positive externalities in Section 5. 
Finally, displacement of theft to other crime types may blunt the effect of the greater 
application of the immobilizer on the overall crime rate. Given the costs associated with 
switching to other crimes, displacement to related crime types is most likely (Cook 1986). We 
obtained data on a similar type of crime, motorcycle theft, during 1995-2010 from the 
Netherlands Department of Motor Vehicles (RDW). The data show that the rate of motorcycle 
theft has been going down since at least 1995. This suggests that displacement, if present, was 
limited. We do not explore crime type displacement further in this paper. 
4  Data and descriptive statistics 
Cars on the road and stolen cars 
The Netherlands Department of Motor Vehicles (RDW) provided us with the universe of stolen 
cars for calendar years 1995-2008. The car theft data include make, model, type and first year 
of registration. The first year of registration of a car is similar to the year of manufacture, 
although the exact production date is somewhat earlier because of the time it takes to transport 
the car and to make the car ready for sale. Data on the number of passenger cars on the road by 
make, model, type and first year of registration for calendar years 2002-2008 were also 
provided by RDW. The data relate to the stock of cars at the end of the calendar year. The year 
of manufacture goes back to 1985. Based on a survival analysis, we extrapolated the number of 
cars on the road by model and by year of manufacture for calendar years before 2002 (see 
Appendix A). 
The theft data and the data on cars on the road do not match at the type level (for instance, 
Honda Civic 1.4i Sport). For this reason, we aggregated the data to the model level (Honda 
Civic). When going from the type to the model level, we accounted for all the different ways 
models are named in the data. In many cases, the commonly known model name is not used, 
but some model identifier from the car manufacturer. For instance, the Honda Civic is also 
known as EC9, ED2, ED3, EJ6, etcetera. Aggregating the data to the level of models is a labor 
intensive process. Consequently, we had to limit our data to a subset of models. 
To obtain a representative sample of passenger cars, we selected models from different 
segments of the car market. We followed the segmentation of the car market that is usual in 
Europe: A (city car), B (economy), C (compact), D (mid-size) and E (executive). We excluded 
segments with a smaller than 5 percent share in the market in 1998, including sports cars (1.7 
percent), large (luxury) cars (0.9 percent), SUVs (1.1 percent) and MPVs (4.5 percent). The 
segment A through E made up 91 percent of the Dutch passenger car market in 1998 
(Bovag/RAI, 2006). Theft rates are relatively high for luxury and sports cars, but they represent 
too small a share of the market to have much of an effect on the average effect of the engine 
immobilizer on car theft. 
We related the number of models per segment to the size of the market segments in 1998. We 
selected 2 models for the A segment (market share of 9 percent), 5 models for the B-segment 
(19 percent), 8 models for the C-segment (30 percent), 7 models for the D-segment (27 
percent), and 2 models for the E-segment (6 percent). 
To make the sample before and after introduction of the engine immobilizer as comparable as 
possible, we selected models that were sold both before and after the introduction of the 
immobilizer in a model. This constraint excluded several models, including those that had very 
few sales either before or after the introduction of the immobilizer such as the Fiat Panda/Seat 
Marbella and the Fiat Uno. We excluded a number of makes with a very small representation in 
the Dutch market, using 5,000 sales per year in the Netherlands in 1995 as the minimum (total 
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sales were 305,415 in 1995). This is equivalent to less than 1.5 percent of annual sales, which 
excludes European makes such as Saab and Lancia and some US makes such as Chevrolet, 
Chrysler and Mercury. 
All models were updated every couple of years, some models were renamed. We excluded 
models for which the introduction of the engine immobilizer coincided with a major update of 
the model. This occurred in several cases, including the Opel Vectra A and B, Opel Omega A 
and B, Nissan Sunny/Almera, Audi 80/A4, Audi 100/A6, and Peugeot 205/206, rendering these 
models invalid for the analysis. 
The models included in the analysis are: Suzuki Alto and Renault Twingo (A-segment), Opel 
Corsa, Honda Civic, Seat Ibiza, Renault Clio and Suzuki Swift (B-segment), Opel Astra, 
Volkswagen Golf, Toyota Corolla, Ford Escort, Peugeot 306/307, Citroën ZX, Volkswagen 
Jetta/Vento/Bora and Seat Toledo (C-segment), VW Passat, BMW 3-series, Peugeot 
405/406/407, Nissan Primera, Mazda 626, Renault Laguna and Toyota Carina/Avensis (D-
segment), Mercedes E and BMW 5-series (E-segment). We combined the Peugeot 306 and 307, 
since the 307 smoothly continued the prior 306. The same holds for the Volkswagen 
Jetta/Vento/Bora, Peugeot 405/406/407 and the Toyota Carina/Avensis. 
Unit of analysis is a cohort of cars from a particular model of a certain age in a particular 
calendar year. To derive theft rates, for every model of a particular age in every calendar year 
we divide the number of stolen cars during that calendar year by the average of the number of 
cars of that model and that age on the road at the beginning and at the end of the year. The 
denominator approximates the number of cars at risk of being stolen during a year. We 
excluded theft rates for cars stolen in the year they were manufactured (age 0). For these cars, 
we could not derive the theft rate, because we do not know the number of cars at risk. The 
vehicle registration data only provides the year of manufacture, not the month and day. As a 
consequence, we do not know how long these cars have been on the road; this can vary 
between 0 and 12 months. We excluded observations for models from a year of manufacture 
with less than 1,000 cars on the road in a calendar year. This affected 170 observations, 
typically years in which a few cars were sold of a model that was discontinued the year before. 
For the same reason, we truncated age of a car at 14 years. Finally, we limited the time window 
around the introduction of the engine immobilizer as standard option to 20 years. We only 
included cars manufactured within this time window. In total, we have 3,597 observations (see 
Appendix B). 
During 1995-1998, the years that the electronic engine immobilizer became a standard option, 
the average theft rate (weighted by the size of cohorts) in our sample is equal to 0.4 percent, 
which is equal to the national average. Moreover, the year-to-year trend in our sample of the 
overall theft rate during 1995-2008 is similar to the national trend. Obtaining a representative 
sample of car models is important, because the theft risk strongly varies between market 
segments. It could well be that the protective effect of the device differs depending on the theft 
risk or the types of offenders that target low-end and high-end cars (we explore heterogeneity in 
the effect in Section 5). In figure 2, we plot the average price of each model by December 1998 
against the theft rate. To make the theft rate comparable across models, we selected cars up to 
three years of age before the electronic engine immobilizer became a standard option. The rate 
of theft of relatively new cars in the E-segment (prices of some 50,000 euro) is about four times 
higher than the rate of  theft in the A-segment (prices of some 10,000 euro). 
[FIGURE 2] 
Application of the engine immobilizer 
Our data on the time that the electronic engine immobilizer became a standard option in a car 
model were compiled by Allianz, a German insurance company (Allianz 1997). In most cases, 
9 
the data relate to the European Union, in some cases the data only relate to Germany. Although 
manufacturing standards for Germany and the Netherlands are generally similar (and about 40 
percent of cars sold in the Netherlands are manufactured in Germany, see Bovag/RAI 2006), in 
these cases we double checked the date with car manuals from that period. For 10 out of the 24 
models, the electronic engine immobilizer became a standard option not on January 1, but later 
in the year.8 For these models, the full impact of the immobilizer may only be felt in the second 
year after the device became a standard option.9 Figure 3 shows the percentage of cars which 
had the electronic engine immobilizer as standard option by year of manufacture. Cars in our 
sample had the device as standard option at the earliest in 1995 and at the latest in 1998. In 
between is a three-year transition period.  
[FIGURE 3] 
Knowing when the device became a standard option provides a good indication of its 
application. As discussed in the previous section, the EU-regulation impacted car security 
through the shock in uniform application of the device. The regulation targeted car 
manufacturers, not individual car buyers. Nonetheless, before the change in manufacturing 
standards, some car manufacters offered the device as option to car buyers. In addition, car 
owners could retrofit the device. The rate of application of the device in cars that do not have it 
as standard option is low, however. The data from Allianz show that if the device was an 
option, typically this choice was only offered one year before it became standard. The 
Netherlands Crime Survey (VMR) suggests low rates of retrofitting of any type of car security. 
In the 2005 survey, almost 90 percent of respondents owning a car reported that they did not 
have a car security device that did not come with the car. Moreover, the car owners that retrofit 
car security are much more likely to install a car alarm than a device like an engine immobilizer 
(Bovag/RAI 2006: 47, Table 9.6). Data from the used car market provide some idea of the rate 
at which the device was chosen as an option or was retrofitted. In cohorts that were 
manufactured before the immobilizer became a standard option, an immobilizer is noted to be 
present in at most 10 percent of cars that were for sale in mid-2012; often rates were much 
lower.10 Because of the non-zero application rates of the device before the change in 
manufacturing standards, our paper provides a lower bound estimate of the effect of the 
electronic engine immobilizer. 
[FIGURE 4] 
In figure 4, we show the rate of car theft by cohort, calendar year, and age for cars with and 
without the electronic engine immobilizer as standard option (the averages are weighted by the 
number of cars on the road for a model by year of manufacture and calendar year). From the 
top graph, it is clear that the theft rate by cohort is on a downward trend before the electronic 
engine immobilizer became a standard option. The downward trend is not necessarily the result 
of changing characteristics of cohorts. After all, cars manufactured in earlier years are on 
average older and have been exposed to theft for a longer time than cars manufactured later. 
The downward trend disappears once the electronic engine immobilizer is a standard option. 
The difference in theft rates between cars with and without the electronic engine immobilizer as 
standard option can also be seen in the two other graphs, which show theft rates by calendar 
year and age of the car. The theft rate is about 50 percent lower when the device is a standard 
option in a car. 
                                               
8 These models are Toyota Corolla, Opel Astra, Opel Corsa, Nissan Primera, Renault Laguna, Honda Civic, 
Seat Toledo, Seat Ibiza, Citroën ZX, Volkswagen Passat. 
9 Generally, car manufacturers did not follow a strategy of making the the device a standard option in the most 
expensive types of a model first. An exception is the Renault Laguna. Given the very short time frame within 
which all cars of this model had the device, the difference in timing should have little effect on our estimates. 
10 Data were compiled for each car model from www.gaspedaal.nl, a website aggregating used cars for sale on 
a number of websites in the Netherlands. 
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Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. 
[TABLE 1] 
5  Empirical analysis 
As a first step, we graphically analyze the effect of the electronic engine immobilizer. Based on 
the identification strategy outlined in Section 2, we specify a model that flexibly estimates the 
effect of the device on the rate of car theft. We estimate the following equation: 
 Ln(yt, a, m) = [β τ Wτ] + αt + αa + αm + εt,a, m             (1) 
The dependent variable yt,a,m is the rate of car theft in calendar year t among age cohort a for car 
model m. Given the wide variation in the rate of theft across models, we take the natural 
logarithm of the theft rate. That allows us to compare percentage changes in the theft rate rather 
than absolute changes in the theft rate. The indicator variables Wτ track the year of 
manufacture-cohort τ which had the electronic engine immobilizer as standard option and the 
year of manufacture-cohorts preceding and following this change in manufacturing standards. 
The indicator variable W1 equals 1 for the first year of manufacture-cohort with the immobilizer 
as standard option and is zero otherwise; W2 equals 1 for the second year of manufacture-cohort 
with standard immobilizer and is zero otherwise, and so on. βτ are the coefficients for each 
cohort that are to be estimated. The period before and after the immobilizer became a standard 
option spans 20 cohorts; 10 year of manufacture-cohorts before the change in manufacturing 
standards and 10 year of manufacture-cohorts after the change. The calendar year-fixed effects 
αt control for events that could raise or lower theft rates in a given calendar year across the 24 
models. The age-fixed effects αa control for the relation between the theft rate and the age of a 
car. The car model-fixed effects αm prevent estimation bias from unobserved factors that 
remained approximately stable over the study period and that caused theft rates to differ across 
models. εt,a, m is an error term. 
[FIGURE 5] 
Figure 5, panel a, plots the estimated indicator coefficients βτ from equation (1). The year of 
manufacture relative to the first cohort with standard electronic engine immobilizer is plotted 
on the horizontal axis. Time one corresponds to the year the electronic engine immobilizer 
became standard in a car model, which varies between 1995 and 1998. The coefficients are 
estimated relative to the first cohort with standard immobilizer, which has a value of zero.  
The figure shows a difference of at least 50 percent in theft rates for cars with and without 
standard application of the security device. The average theft rate remains roughly flat for later 
cohorts with standard immobilizer, which suggests that on average the immobilizer remained 
equally effective up to ten years after it became a standard option.  
The break between the two series is not fully discrete. First, the theft rate of the last cohort 
without standard immobilizer is somewhat lower than the theft rates of earlier cohorts. Second, 
the theft rate of the first cohort with standard immobilizer is higher than the theft rates of later 
cohorts. As discussed earlier, the latter phenomenon can be explained by the fact that, for 
several car models, it took more than one year before a complete cohort was uniformly fitted 
with the device. In other words: the full impact of the immobilizer can only be inferred from 
the second cohort after the change in manufacturing standards.  
The relatively low theft rate for the last cohort without immobilizer can be explained in two 
ways. First, it could be that just before the immobilizer became a standard option, the 
application of other security measures experienced relatively strong growth. This would be 
problematic for our identification strategy, because we assume the shock in the application of 
the immobilizer to be distinct from the more gradual growth in the use of other security 
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measures. As discussed in Section 2, the available evidence supports this assumption, which 
makes this first explanation unlikely. A second explanation is that cars manufactured just 
before the immobilizer was uniformly applied have lower theft rates because they suffered less 
from displacement of theft than older cohorts. These cars looked most similar to cars with 
standard immobilizer (see Section 3). To examine this explanation more closely, next, we 
analyze displacement of theft to older cohorts. 
To identify displacement of theft to older cohorts, we estimate the indicator variables for 
cohorts without a standard immobilizer both before and after cars with standard immobilizer 
came on the market. Before the change in manufacturing standards, displacement was not an 
issue, at least not within a specific car model. After the change, offenders had the choice 
between cars of a particular model with and without the immobilizer as standard option. If 
displacement is present, then the second set of coefficients should feature higher theft rates than 
the first set of coefficients. We limit our sample to those car models that were observed in 
calender years before and after the immobilizer became a standard option. Only for these 
models can we identify how the theft rate for cars without the immobilizer as standard option 
changed as a result of the change in manufacturing standards. Since the device was made 
standard in 1995 for several models and the first calender year in our data is 1995, this leaves 
us with 11 models. We estimate the following equation: 
Ln(yt,a,m) = [I(t <YR_IMMOm)βτ Wτ] + [I(t ≥YR_IMMOm)β'τ Wτ]+ αt + αa + αm + εt,a, m  (2) 
YR_IMMOm denotes the year by which the electronic engine immobilizer became a standard 
option in car model m. In this subsample, this varies between 1996 and 1998. I(t <YR_IMMOm) 
represents an indicator function which has a value of one for those calendar years that the 
immobilizer was not yet a standard option in a car model and zero otherwise. Similarly, I(t 
≥YR_IMMOm) has a value of one for those calendar years that the immobilizer was a standard 
option in a car model and zero otherwise. We estimate two sets of coefficients for cohorts 
without the device as standard option: βτ before the change in manufacturing standards within a 
model and β'τ after the change. These cohorts may have been exposed to displacement effects. 
Clearly, for cohorts with standard immobilizer we only have one set of coefficients. For these 
cohorts, the condition t ≥YR_IMMOm always holds. 
Figure 5, panel b, presents the estimated coefficients βτ and β'τ. The baseline theft rates for 
cohorts without standard immobilizer, i.e. those estimated for the period before cohorts with 
standard immobilizer came on the market, show a gradual downward trend. This trend may be 
explained by the gradual introduction of more security features in cars, as discussed in Section 
2.11 The difference in the theft risk between the baseline coefficients of the cohorts without 
standard immobilizer and those of the cohorts with standard immobilizer is about 75 percent. 
This is the gross effect, not accounting for displacement of theft. Displacement is the difference 
in theft risk between cohorts without standard immobilizer in calendar years before and after 
the change in manufacturing standards. This difference is some 25 percent. In other words, 
during 1995-1998, the move towards uniform application of the immobilizer reduced the 
overall rate of car theft by 75 minus 25 equals 50 percent. 
During the period after the change in manufacturing standards, the theft rate of the very last 
cohort of cars without standard immobilizer was relatively low. This is in line with what we 
found in Figure 5, panel a. Compared to earlier cohorts, this last cohort may not have suffered 
from displacement of theft to the same extent. By lack of a baseline estimate for this cohort (see 
footnote 11), we cannot draw hard conclusions about the nature of this externality, however. 
                                               
11 Because of data limitations, we cannot estimate the coefficient for the last cohort without standard 
immobilizer before the change in manufacturing standards. The observations are missing because we cannot 
derive theft rates for cars with age 0 (see Section 4). 
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Parametric evidence for an effect of the electronic engine immobilizer 
Next, we analyze whether the average effect of having the electronic engine immobilizer 
installed meets the standards of statistical significance. We estimate the following equation: 
 Ln(yt, a, m) = β IMMOt,a,m + αt + αa + αm + αc + εt,a, m                (3) 
IMMOt,a,m denotes the share of cars of model m with age a in calendar year t that has the 
electronic engine immobilizer as standard option. Parameter of interest is β, which denotes the 
percentage change in the rate of car theft resulting from having the immobilizer as standard 
option. Since cohorts without standard immobilizer show a downward trend in the theft rate by 
year of manufacture in Figure 5, we also include fixed effects for year of manufacture αc (or 
cohort-fixed effects) in the estimation equation. Note that even if we introduce cohort-fixed 
effects we are able to identify the effect of the immobilizer because the immobilizer became 
standard for different models in different years. We assume a similar impact on the theft rate of 
the immobilizer across models. In the sensitivity analysis, we allow the effect to vary between 
segments of the car market. 
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 2. The first column reports the results of the 
estimation equation (3), the baseline specification. We find a highly significant 72 percent 
reduction in the theft risk as a result of having the electronic engine immobilizer as standard 
option.  
Given possible positive and negative externalities on the theft risk of other cars, the net effect 
on the theft rate may be different. As a next step, we allow for externalities. We include an 
indicator variable which is one for cohorts without a standard immobilizer during the time that 
cars with standard immobilizer were on the market and zero otherwise. In column (2), we find 
this displacement indicator to be positive, suggesting on average a 26 percent higher theft rate 
for older cohorts without standard immobilizer during the period of our analysis. Our estimate 
of the displacement parameter is not very precise, however. When taking into account this 
estimate of displacement, the net theft-reducing effect is 46 percent. Apparently, a little less 
than a third of the drop in the theft risk for cars with standard immobilizer was shifted to older 
cars. Clearly, over time, this displacement effect diminishes in importance because of the 
dwindling stock of old cars without standard immobilizer (see Figure 1). 
To analyze how robust our results are to different specifications, we conduct two sensitivity 
tests. First, in our baseline specification, we use a 10-year period before and after the change in 
manufacturing standards. A long time window may introduce estimation bias through the 
presence of heterogeneity. Cars manufactured many years before or after the change in 
manufacturing standards are more likely to be different than cars manufactured just before and 
after the change. If these other characteristics affect the treatment and experimental group 
differently, then the estimated effect is likely to be biased. In the second column, we halve the 
time window around the change in manufacturing standards to 10 years rather than 20 years. 
We find very similar results, suggesting the absence of an estimation bias. 
[FIGURE 6] 
Given the difference in theft rates between market segments discussed in Section 4, the 
immobilizer may have had a different impact on different segments. Anecdotal evidence from 
police investigators suggests the deterrent effect to be largest for offenders looking for an easy-
to-steal car for the purpose of joyriding or solving a temporary transportation problem after a 
night out relative to more professional offenders stealing cars for sale or for car parts (see also 
Brown, 2004). Inexpensive cars parked on a public street tend to be the target of the first group 
of offenders. To analyze heterogeneity in the theft-reducing effect, we allow the effect to differ 
between the five market segments. We fully interact the policy variable with dummy variables 
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for each segment. The results are reported in Column (4) of Table 2. As expected, we find the 
theft-reducing effect to be highest for the most inexpensive cars (city car and economy). The 
reduction in car theft is about twice as large in segments A and B compared to the other 
segments.12 The difference between these two groups of market segments is statistically 
significant. In other words, those who had a relatively low theft risk to begin with saw that risk 
reduced to close to zero; cars with an elevated risk of theft experienced a much smaller 
protective effect. This relationship is shown in Figure 6. The theft-reducing effect of the 
electronic engine immobilizer is negatively related to the theft risk prior to the device becoming 
a standard option. 
6  Benefits and costs of the regulation 
The electronic engine immobilizer is an unobtrusive device that does not require anything else 
than taking the key out of the ignition. It does not pose additional effort on motorists. The 
additional manufacturing costs related to installing an electronic engine immobilizer have been 
estimated by the Netherlands Institute for Certification of Vehicle Security Systems (SCM) to 
be no more than 50 Euro per car. The costs related to drafting and maintaining the security 
standard are mostly fixed. Given the number of cars produced every year, these other costs are 
low and ignored. 
On average over the period 1995-2008, uniform application of the immobilizer reduced the rate 
of car theft by an estimated 46 percent – taking into account displacement of theft to older 
vehicles. Based on a 46 percent decline in the theft rate of 0.5 percent before the immobilizer 
became standard, and assuming the life cycle of a car to be 14.5 years, the costs per prevented 
car theft amount to some 1,500 Euro. 
Dubourg, Hamed and Thorns (2005) put the average ex-post social costs of a motor vehicle 
theft at some 6,600 Euro. The average costs of a car theft are somewhat higher as motor 
vehicles other than cars tend to represent lower value. Other sources provide similar or higher 
estimates of the benefits. Using contingent valuation, Cohen et al. (2004) put the mean cost at 
5,000 Euro; based on jury awards in the US, Roman (2009) puts the mean cost of motor vehicle 
theft at 12,000 Euro. Based on these estimates, we conclude that the social benefits of having 
an electronic engine immobilizer as standard option are several times higher than the costs.  
7  Conclusions 
This paper provides a first estimate of both the protective effect and the displacement effect of 
the electronic engine immobilizer on the nation-wide rate of car theft, based on detailed data for 
a representative sample of passenger cars in the Netherlands. The electronic engine immobilizer 
is a simple and low-cost anti-theft device whose application has been made mandatory in many 
parts of the world, including the European Union, Australia and Canada. We exploit the EU-
regulation as source of exogenous variation in use of the device by year of manufacture of car 
models.  
We find that uniform application of the precautionary measure in new cars led to a dramatic 
and prolonged reduction in car theft. The effectiveness of the device remained roughly equal in 
the ten years after it was made a standard option in cars. When taking into account 
displacement of theft to older cars, the device lowered the overall rate of car theft on average 
by about 50 percent during 1995-2008. We do not find evidence of displacement of car theft to 
a related crime type, motorcycle theft. Owners of relatively inexpensive cars benefitted most 
from having the electronic engine immobilizer installed. This is in line with anecdotal evidence 
                                               
12 The actual difference in effect may be somewhat smaller if endogeneity in application of the security device 
is greater for the premium segments than for the other segments, as discussed in Section 4. 
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that occassional offenders looking for easy-to-steal cars were more easily deterred than more 
professional offenders who tend to have less interest in the cheapest segments of the car 
market. 
The size of the crime-reducing effect that we estimated may be conditional on the uniform, 
mandatory use of the device in new cars. For instance, opportunities for target displacement are 
likely to be closed off slower under optional rather than mandatory application. For this reason, 
the effect of the device may be different in countries that did not regulate its use, such as the 
US. 
Finding a long-lived drop in the theft rate implies that the within-crime elasticity to other modi 
operandi (or ‘tactical displacement’) is low, at least within the first ten years after introduction 
of the engine immobilizer. Anecdotal evidence suggests that only a minority of offenders 
switched to other modi operandi, including break-and-enter to obtain car keys. That is an 
important lesson for policy, since uniform regulation of a security device invites offenders to 
focus their efforts on overcoming this one hurdle, which could make the protective effect of the 
device short-lived. 
The costs per prevented theft are estimated at 1,500 Euro, which is a fraction of the average 
social benefits of a prevented car theft. Our findings show that a uniform, one-size-fits-all 
prevention measure that does not discriminate between targets that are at high or low risk can 
still be beneficial from a social welfare perspective. This result can only be explained by the 
presence of substantial positive externalities in car security or by a tendency of people not to 
act in their own best interest. Since we find little evidence for the presence of major positive 
externalities, the rationale for regulating this security device lies in the apparent difficulty 
people have in taking appropriate precautionary measures. The average car owner seems to be 
limited in his or her ability to anticipate on the losses of a rare event like car theft. The evidence 
presented in this paper suggests that government regulation can make people better off by 
helping them to commit to a strategy of precaution. This way, crime can be lowered 
substantially and for a prolonged period without the involvement of a single social worker, 
police officer or corrections officer. As such, strengthening victim precaution provides an 
interesting alternative to well-studied crime policies that are aimed at punishing or 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Rate of car theft (per 1,000  cars) 2.97 2.83 0.08 23.51 
  without electronic engine immobilizer as standard option 3.89 3.20 0.08 23.51 
  with electronic engine immobilizer as standard option* 1.87 1.78 0.10 18.72 
Car price as at December 1998 (in 1998 euros) 18,725 8,447 8,500 49,000 
Year of manufacture 1995 4.47 1985 2007 
Age 6.82 3.69 1 14 
Electronic engine immobilizer as standard option 0.43 0.49 0 1 
Year electronic engine immobilizer became standard option 1996 1.12 1995 1998 
Note. Based on 3,597 observations. Yearly data for calendar years 1995-2008 for 24 car models up to 14 years of 
age, manufactured between up to 10 years before and up to 10 years after the electronic engine immobilizer 
became a standard option in a car model. Number of observations varies between models. Mean is weighted by 
number of cars in a cohort. To provide consistency with the estimates based on the natural logarithm of the theft 
rate presented in Table 2, 115 observations for which theft rate is zero are excluded. (*) Including cohorts that 
were only partly fitted with the electronic engine immobilizer as standard option. 
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Table 2. Estimated effect of the electronic engine immobilizer on car theft  
Dependent variable: 
ln(rate of car theft) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Electronic engine immobilizer 
as standard option 
-0.72 (0.12)*** -0.46 (0.14)*** -0.42 (0.14)***  
     
   * segment a    -0.68 (0.18)*** 
   * segment b    -0.75 (0.25)*** 
   * segment c    -0.34 (0.19)* ** 
   * segment d    -0.31 (0.18)* ** 
   * segment e    -0.16 (0.20)*** 
Cohorts without standard 
immobilizer (period after 
immobilizer became standard) 
 0.26 (0.13)* 0.23 (0.13)* 0.28 (0.13)** * 
     
Time window 20 20 10 20 
Number of observations 3,597 3,597 2,465 3,597 
Note. Based on annual data for 24 car models. All estimates contain fixed effects for calendar year, car model, age 
of car, and year of manufacture. Between parentheses standard errors clustered by car model. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 
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Figure 1. Passenger cars fitted with an electronic engine immobilizer, US and the 
Netherlands, 1990-2010 (%) 
 
Source. Estimates for US based on data from Ward’s Auto reported in Maxfield and Clarke (2009); estimates for 





























Figure 2. Theft rate by price of car 
 
Note. Theft rate for cars without electronic engine immobilizer, up to three years of age, for cohorts greater than 
2,500 cars. Price in euros is the average price for a model without optional features by December 1998. 
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Figure 3. Share of new cars with electronic engine immobilizer as standard option 
 





































Figure 4. Car theft by cohort, calendar year and age 
(a) By year of manufacture 
  
(b) By calendar year 
  
(c) By age 
  
Note. Car theft rates are weighted by number of cars on the road. Excluding cohorts of car models that were only 
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Figure 5. Average rate of car theft, relative to first year of manufacture-cohort with 
electronic engine immobilizer as standard option, 1995-2008 
 
(a) Full sample 
 
Note. Graph plots coefficients βτ from estimation equation (1). Based on yearly data for 1995-2008 for 24 car 
models aged 1-14. Number of observations: 3,597. 
 
(b) Sub-sample of cars observed before and after immobilizer became standard option 
 
 
Note. Graph plots coefficients βτ (open dots) and β'τ (closed dots) from estimation equation (2). Based on yearly 
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Year of manufacture, relative to first cohort with standard immobilizer
(year 1 = first year of manufacture-cohort with standard immobilizer)
Cohorts without standard immobilizer, calendar years before immobilizer became standard
Cohorts without standard immobilizer, calendar years after immobilizer became standard
Cohorts with standard immobilizer
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Figure 6. Estimated theft-reducing effect by market segment 
 
Note. On the horizontal axis the average theft rate by market segment for cars without electronic engine 


















































Average theft risk prior to electronic engine immobilizer (%)
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Appendix A – Calculating missing values of the number of cars on the road  
 
Our data contains information about the number of cars on the road for each age category and 
car model from 2002 to 2008 (as of December 31 of each year). Our analysis requires 
information about the number of cars on the road from (31 December) 1994 to 2008. The 
missing information was calculated as follows. First we calculated for each available calendar 
year age-specific and model-specific survival fractions s: 
 
stam = Ctam/Ct+1,a+1,m 
 
where C is the number of cars on the road, t is an index for calendar year, a an index for age 
and m an index for model. Then we regressed the survival fractions on age categories so that 
we have age and model-specific survivor fractions: 
 
stam = λam a + vtam 
 
where v represents an error term. We then use these estimated survivor fractions to calculate 
missing numbers of cars on the road. For example: 
 
C2001am = λam C2002,a+1,m 
 






Appendix B – Supplementary statistics at the level of car models  
 
 Theftrate  









 Mean Min Max Min Max  
A-segment        
1 Renault Twingo 1.04 0.12 3.07 1993 2007 1998 113 
2 Suzuki Alto 1.34 0.08 8.56 1987 2005 1997 169 
        
B-segment        
3 Honda Civic 3.54 0.30 10.73 1985 2002 19951 164 
4 Opel Corsa 3.62 0.19 14.94 1985 2004 19952 180 
5 Renault Clio 1.44 0.15 3.44 1991 2007 1998 140 
6 Seat Ibiza 1.57 0.24 5.88 1986 2005 19963 171 
7 Suzuki Swift 0.98 0.20 2.69 1987 2006 1997 163 
        
C-segment        
8 Citroën ZX 0.91 0.20 2.30 1991 1997 19953 79 
9 Ford Escort 4.99 0.33 14.63 1988 2000 1998 135 
10 Opel Astra 1.35 0.31 4.40 1991 2004 19953 135 
11 Peugeot 306/307 7.38 0.61 23.02 1993 2005 1996 98 
12 Seat Toledo 2.19 0.32 6.56 1992 2005 19964 98 
13 Toyota Corolla 0.90 0.10 2.26 1987 2006 19973 169 
14 VW Golf 5.55 0.79 12.23 1985 2004 1995 180 
15 VW Jetta/Vento/Bora 3.58 0.36 10.08 1985 2003 1995 164 
        
D-segment        
16 BMW 3 3.68 0.72 10.46 1985 2004 1995 180 
17 Mazda 626 2.14 0.17 5.63 1985 2001 19955 156 
18 Nissan Primera 1.44 0.18 5.38 1990 2004 19953 137 
19 Peugeot 405/406/407 1.17 0.13 2.95 1987 2005 1996 168 
20 Renault Laguna 1.00 0.14 2.52 1994 2004 19956 95 
21 Toyota Carina/Avensis 1.30 0.15 3.76 1987 2006 1997 164 
22 VW Passat 2.73 0.26 7.15 1985 2004 19953 180 
        
E-segment        
23 BMW 5 5.28 0.56 14.66 1985 2004 1995 179 
24 Mercedes E 7.98 1.27 23.51 1985 2004 1995 180 
        
Total       3,597 
 
Note. (1) First year 70% of cohort; (2) First year 25% of cohort; (3) First year 50% of cohort; (4) First year 40% of 
cohort; (5) First year 90% of cohort; (6) First year 20% of cohort; second year 50% of cohort. 
